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NO. 24 MAY 2020 Introduction 
Turkey and Russia: 
No Birds of the Same Feather 
Dimitar Bechev and Suat Kınıklıoğlu 
Since Turkey’s controversial acquisition of the S-400 missile system from Russia, 
the narrative that the EU is facing a twin challenge from the East has been gaining 
currency in European capitals. Turkey and Russia are often portrayed as two authori-
tarian regimes led by strong leaders who favour an omnipotent state at the expense 
of fundamental freedoms and liberal democratic institutions. Yet, putting these two 
countries into the same basket and formulating policies accordingly is problematic. 
The EU has separate sets of relations with Russia and Turkey. Ankara remains part of 
NATO and the EU’s Customs Union. That said, Turkey is quickly approaching a critical 
crossroad on its turbulent political journey: The country will either consolidate its 
authoritarian regime or return to democracy. The EU has a high stake in this matter, 
and thus it needs to take a proactive stance in favour of pro-democracy forces. 
 
On 17 February 2020, a court in Istanbul 
acquitted prominent philanthropist Osman 
Kavala, who was accused of attempting 
to overthrow the Turkish government by 
organising the 2013 Gezi protests. But the 
joy of those who welcomed the release 
proved short-lived. Kavala was promptly 
taken back into custody, this time on charges 
of espionage and links to the failed coup 
in 2016. 
Days before, on 11 February, magistrates 
in the Russian town of Penza sentenced 
seven young left-wing activists to 6 to 18 
years in prison. Their crime? Plotting ter-
rorist attacks during the 2018 presidential 
election and the World Cup. Many observ-
ers likened the so-called Network (Set’) case 
to Stalin’s show trials. Rather than deliver 
justice, the court’s mission appeared to be 
stamping out dissent. 
These two stories lay bare the unnerving 
similarities between Turkey and Russia. In 
2018, the international watchdog Freedom 
House downgraded Turkey from “partly 
free” to “not free”. Russia was demoted back 
in 2004, at the end of Putin’s first term. Con-
stitutional changes in Turkey, in force since 
2018, transferred all essential powers to 
President Erdoğan. Checks on the executive 
branch, from the media all the way to par-
liament, have been dismantled. In Russia, 
Putin has amended the constitution so as to 
be eligible to rule for another two six-year 
terms after 2024. Expectations that he might 
cede power, step by step, to a successor 
have evaporated. 
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Comparing Erdoğan and Putin is nothing 
new. Their core messages converge: first, 
that strong leadership is essential for bet-
tering ordinary citizens’ lives, delivering 
economic growth, and ensuring stability; 
second, that the Motherland, whether Russia 
or Turkey, is under threat from “foreign” – 
read Western – and “domestic enemies” 
sowing disunity to prevent its rise in the in-
ternational arena. The Kremlin propaganda 
machine blew this argument out of pro-
portion after Putin’s 2012 return to the 
presidency, and especially with the seizure 
of Crimea and the war in Ukraine. Erdoğan, 
too, has been rallying the public behind the 
flag for years: holding mass rallies during 
the Mavi Marmara crisis, which aimed at 
breaking Israel’s embargo on Gaza in 2010, 
labelling Gezi Park protests a foreign con-
spiracy, blaming the US for the 2016 coup 
attempt, and intervening in Syria to fight 
the outlawed PKK. For both of them, rally-
ing the public behind the flag, with help 
from loyalist media, became the strategy 
of choice. 
Putin and Erdoğan have turned into a 
diplomatic double act, with the recent 
agreement for a ceasefire in Idlib being 
the latest example. Both espouse a vision 
of a multipolar world free of US hegemony. 
Rather than an outpost of NATO or an 
eternal EU membership candidate, Turkey 
sees itself as an autonomous power whose 
writ runs from Libya to Syria and from 
Sudan to the Gulf. Ties with influential 
global players such as Russia and China are, 
according to Erdoğan and his circle, essen-
tial to the national interest. Likewise, Rus-
sia considers Turkey a partner, even though 
their policies may be at odds, as in Syria 
and Libya. Putin and Erdoğan have managed 
to keep conflicts under a lid and maximise 
overlapping interests.  
Yet, Turkey is, and will remain, different 
from Russia. It has a relatively more com-
petitive political system shaped by decades 
of democratic development. The strength of 
the opposition, the structure of the economy, 
and the nature of linkages to the West 
make it unlikely that Turkey will consoli-
date an authoritarian system resembling 
Russia’s. Ankara is not coming into Mos-
cow’s geopolitical orbit either. It still has 
a strong interest in maintaining links with 
the EU and the US instead of membership 
in a league of autocrats. What Erdoğan 
does – similar to his role model Sultan 
Abdulhamid II – is play Russia against 
the West, and vice versa, in pursuit of maxi-
mum strategic autonomy. 
The Russian “Model” 
Russia has almost no democratic record. 
It was only in 1906 that the Tsarist Empire 
adopted a constitution and had its first 
legislative elections. However, the Bolshe-
vik takeover in 1917 put an end to gradual 
liberalisation. Political pluralism resurfaced 
only during perestroika of the 80s and in 
the early 90s with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the birth of the Russian Fed-
eration opening new opportunities. Yet, 
democratisation faltered at two critical 
junctures. In 1993, President Boris Yeltsin 
used the armed forces to storm and dis-
solve the opposition-run legislature. Russia 
adopted a new constitution that enhanced 
the role of the executive. Then, in the 1996 
presidential elections, large-scale manipu-
lation prevented the transfer of power to 
Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Com-
munist Party of the Russian Federation. 
Political rights and civil freedoms thrived as 
never before in the 90s, yet the presidency 
dominated other branches of government, 
with Yeltsin being dependent on oligarchs 
and special interests. 
In the 2000s, Putin changed the rules, 
becoming an indispensable arbiter for clans 
in government: e.g. oligarchs, the siloviki 
(security elite), and civilian technocrats. Op-
position parties were co-opted by the Krem-
lin while opponents, such as oligarchs Boris 
Berezovsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, had 
their business empires destroyed and assets 
redistributed to pro-regime tycoons. Rapid 
growth fuelled by high oil prices made 
Putin’s rule popular. Unlike post-commu-
nist countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
as well as Turkey, elections and democratic 
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institutions turned into a façade, though 
civil society and, to a lesser degree, media 
freedoms were not curtailed. 
Putin’s third term as president (2012–8) 
saw Russia drifting further into authoritar-
ianism. From an arbiter, he morphed into a 
quasi-monarchical figure. Faced with civic 
protests in 2011–2, the regime grew more 
repressive. Putin sought to bolster his ratings 
through assertive foreign policy, opposition 
to the West, and the appeal to nationalism. 
Over the past years, economic stagna-
tion, anti-elite sentiment, and traditionally 
low levels of trust in public institutions 
have eroded the regime’s legitimacy. Though 
Putin’s regime is resilient, constitutional 
amendments do show it is concerned about 
its long-term survival. COVID-19 has put 
on display its inefficiency and vulnerability. 
Putin fails to inspire much enthusiasm, 
but a majority of citizens see no credible 
alternative. 
Turkey’s Brand of 
Competitive Authoritarianism 
Turkey has followed a rather different his-
torical trajectory. It opened up its political 
system, abolishing one-party rule after the 
Second World War. For decades, parties 
of various ideological stripes have vied for 
votes in competitive elections, bargained, 
and entered into coalitions to share spoils 
and governance responsibilities. Turkey 
became exposed to Western liberal norms 
thanks to NATO and association with the 
European Economic Community. That said, 
all the way until the mid-2000s, the mili-
tary limited elected politicians’ authority 
by intervening in decision-making and 
staging periodic coups. Still, military tu-
telage allowed for free and sufficiently fair 
elections, a robust media, and civil society.  
The rise of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) proved to be a game changer. 
Electoral success propelled Erdoğan to 
power and ultimately enabled him to elimi-
nate constraints to his rule. The military 
was defanged thanks to EU-led reforms and, 
later on, through a series of highly contro-
versial trials. The 2010 referendum diluted 
the judiciary’s autonomy. The clash with 
the Gülen movement – accused of foment-
ing the July 2016 coup – and the ensuing 
purges completed the takeover of state bu-
reaucracy. Targeted repression tamed the 
opposition and civil society. AKP-friendly 
businesses gradually took ownership of 
major media. The constitutional changes 
of2017 handed all power to Erdoğan, sub-
stantially downgrading the Grand National 
Assembly, the ultimate check on executive 
authority. 
Still, Turkey has not transitioned to a 
full-fledged autocracy. 
In contrast to Russia, Turkish elections are 
contested and, as the 2019 local polls demon-
strated, the opposition has a chance to win. 
In Moscow’s city elections last September, 
Navalny’s candidates were banned from 
running. Turkey is relatively new to elec-
toral fraud. Although there were impropri-
eties in the Ankara election in 2014, the 
overall validity of the vote was only seriously 
questioned in the constitutional referen-
dum of April 2017. 
Opposition parties (CHP, HDP, and the 
Iyi Party) are relatively strong in Turkey, 
despite suppression. They have access to 
resources, experience of governance at the 
local and, historically, national levels, and 
robust links to their relative electorate, 
which turns out en masse at the ballot box. 
That is not the case in Russia, where only 
communists have similar reach, yet are co-
opted by the Kremlin. The Turkish oppo-
sition has adapted and learnt to compete 
under the presidential regime: coordinating 
electoral strategies, fielding joint candi-
dates, setting aside ideological differences, 
etc. That has started to happen only recently 
in Russia. 
What also matters is the electoral culture. 
The Turkish electorate is conscious of its 
power to change governments through elec-
tions and is unwilling to relinquish that 
privilege. After winning Ankara and Istan-
bul, the united opposition may – theoreti-
cally – repeat its success at the next parlia-
mentary elections and even capture a major-
ity of seats in the Grand National Assembly. 
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Of course, the playing field in Turkey is 
skewed. Erdoğan controls state resources, 
major parts of the media, and, most impor-
tantly, the Supreme Election Council. He 
has demonstrated his ability to manipulate 
the electoral process through various 
means: e.g. the state of emergency during 
the 2017 constitutional referendum or the 
outbreak of war with the PKK during the 
November 2015 legislative elections. Vote 
rigging or removal of elected officials, e.g. 
mayors from the pro-Kurdish HDP, is part 
of the toolbox. But the regime has applied 
the same tactics much more sparingly in 
western Turkey. 
Implications for Europe 
Turkey is not likely to consolidate as an 
autocratic system, even though such an out-
come cannot be dismissed altogether. Putin-
ism, a product of conditions specific to Rus-
sia, is hardly a blueprint either. That does 
not imply that, in contrast to Turkey, the 
Russian polity is destined to remain authori-
tarian. On the contrary, factors such as a 
highly educated population, a large middle 
class, as well as the rising intolerance to 
corruption and state capture may favour 
democratic development over the long 
term. But what it does suggest is that the 
similarities Russia and Turkey exhibit are 
emblematic of all authoritarian or hybrid 
regimes, rather than a result of Erdoğan 
borrowing from Putin. 
These differences bring into question the 
argument that Turkey and Russia constitute 
an autocratic bloc. Elites in both countries 
tend to espouse strong anti-hegemonic in-
stincts, believe in state strength, and often 
resort to nationalism and religious con-
servatism to draw a line against the West. 
However, Russia as well as Turkey have 
proven flexible in their day-to-day conduct-
ing of foreign policy. Recently, for instance, 
Moscow sought US mediation in its oil price 
dispute with Saudi Arabia. Turkey found 
itself seeking loans or swap deals from 
the US and UK and hinted at freezing the 
deployment of the S-400 air defence system. 
Nevertheless, the EU must take a long-
term view and recognise that the next few 
years are critical for Turkey’s ailing democ-
racy. Although Russia will remain authori-
tarian for some time to come, Turkey is 
approaching a historic crossroad: Either 
authoritarianism will be consolidated or 
some sort of return to parliamentary de-
mocracy will prevail. Hence, the EU should 
strongly support pro-democracy forces in 
Turkey by increasing its support for civil 
society, intellectuals, and the remaining 
independent media. The Union should con-
tinue to make critical issues such as the 
customs union upgrade, visa liberalisation, 
and financial support for Syrian refugees 
conditional on concrete steps towards 
democratisation. European decision-makers 
must look beyond the nativist populism of 
Erdoğan and recognise that a considerable 
part of the country no longer supports an 
executive presidency, but rather prefers a 
return to parliamentary democracy. 
European support for Turkish democracy 
matters. Such support should not be only at 
the discourse level, but must be augmented 
by concrete measures to support pro-democ-
racy forces in Turkey. The next few years 
will determine the outcome of the drawn-
out struggle for the soul of Turkey. Hence, 
it is critical to understand the gravity of the 
current time frame and take a pro-active 
stance in favour of Turkish democracy. 
Dimitar Bechev is Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. 
Suat Kınıklıoğlu is a Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at SWP. 
The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) is funded by 
Stiftung Mercator and the German Federal Foreign Office. 
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